



Early Journal Content on JSTOR, Free to Anyone in the World

This article is one of nearly 500,000 scholarly works digitized and made freely available to everyone in the world by JSTOR.

Known as the Early Journal Content, this set of works include research articles, news, letters, and other writings published in more than 200 of the oldest leading academic journals. The works date from the mid-seventeenth to the early twentieth centuries.

We encourage people to read and share the Early Journal Content openly and to tell others that this resource exists. People may post this content online or redistribute in any way for non-commercial purposes.

Read more about Early Journal Content at <http://about.jstor.org/participate-jstor/individuals/early-journal-content>.

JSTOR is a digital library of academic journals, books, and primary source objects. JSTOR helps people discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content through a powerful research and teaching platform, and preserves this content for future generations. JSTOR is part of ITHAKA, a not-for-profit organization that also includes Ithaka S+R and Portico. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

ALBERDI'S VIEWS ON THE MONROE DOCTRINE*

If we accept the analysis of Pan Americanism made by Professor Ernesto Quesada or by Helio Lobo, as both explain its evolution in recent articles, that subject has had three general periods in its development.¹ The first, covering roughly two-thirds of the nineteenth century, is that of Pan Spanish Americanism, in which the American states of Spanish origin on the ground that they form one country, one race, and one culture were to be organized into an international league of defense, involving political and economic coöperation. This movement developed into Pan Latin-Americanism by the inclusion of Brazil, which country, it is explained, by the supposed abandonment of imperial ambitions, by its abolition of slavery, and by its change to a republican form of government made possible this *rapprochement*. This period, short-lived in matter of time, gave way to what Quesada calls a "transcendental evolution"—Pan Americanism.²

As a staunch advocate of the first of these movements; as an important contributor to Hispanic American political theory compared in this respect by García Mérou to Alexander Hamilton; as an influential commentator on inter-America diplomacy—placed by some in the rank of Bilbao, Vigil, Carrasco, Albano, Calvo, and Drago; and as publicist and statesman, Juan Bautista Alberdi deserves and has received extended notice from stu-

* Read at the Conference on Hispanic American History at Cleveland, O., on December 30, 1919, at the annual meeting of the American Historical Association.

¹ Ernesto Quesada, *La Evolución del Panamericanismo*, (Revista de la Universidad de Buenos Aires, XLI. and XLII. 1919, pp. 289-352. Professor Quesada (p. 351) makes the interesting statement that he is the first professor of Pan Americanism to be appointed in any university of the continent. Cf. Helio Lobo, *De Monroe á Rio-Banco*.

² Quesada, *op. cit.*, 291. "Pero en el último tercio del siglo anterior se produce una nueva y transcendental evolución; el panamericanismo continental se substituye al panlatinoamericanismo, introduciendo el elemento estadounidense en la agrupación anterior; esta vez, tal inclusión constituía una verdadera revolución,

."

dents of American relations and history. His published works, of which some parts were written more than a half century ago, have a significance which statesmen as well as students must take seriously into consideration. With respect to the contemporary value and influence of Alberdi's *Memoria sobre la conveniencia y objetos de un congreso general americano*, written in 1844, Professor G. Nicolás Matienzo says, "Gran parte de ella parece escrita en el presente año de 1910, tal es la frescura de sus observaciones y sus juicios".³ And Dr. Santiago Baqué, writing of Alberdi's economic and sociological theories and policies, remarks: "Hay que reconocer no obstante que Alberdi ha triunfado".

It is, of course, outside the severely limited scope of this paper to discuss or even comment upon the details of Alberdi's life. It must suffice us to say that this famous writer led a life between the years 1810 and 1884 of versatile and sustained activity. The story of Alberdi as a journalist, a poet, and a musician; that of him as a voluntary exile from his native country during the era of Rosas; that of his membership in the famous *Asociación de Mayo* and his participation in its work; that of him as a successful lawyer in Chile; of his effective propaganda to relieve his country of the tyrant; of his part in the movement of Urquiza; of Alberdi the pamphleteer, the bitter, sarcastic controversialist who engaged in many acrimonious polemics, notably with Sarmiento and Mitre; that of his peculiar attitude and activity during the war with Paraguay; and finally the story of him as a diplomat in Europe, as a pacifist who wrote about war as a crime—all this must be left to his biographers, García Mérou, Pelliza, Santiago Baqué, Matienzo, Bilbao and Reynal O'Connor, and Olleros.⁴

³ Matienzo, "La Política Americana de Alberdi", *Revista Argentina de Ciencias Políticas*, 1910).

⁴ For biographical matter see M. García Mérou, *Juan Bautista Alberdi* (Ensayo crítico) 1890; José J. Biedma and J. A. Pillado, *Alberdi*, 1897; Manuel Bilbao and A. Reynal O'Connor, *Apuntes biográficos del Doctor Don Juan Bautista Alberdi* (Tomo 1, of *Obras Completas* of Alberdi), 1886; Mariano A. Pelliza, *Alberdi, su Vida y sus Escritos* (1874); T. Mannequin, *J. B. Alberdi (Journal des Économistes*, III. 1884); for the Paraguay episode see Mariano L. Olleros, *Alberdi, a la Luz de sus Escritos en cuanto se refieren al Paraguay*, 1905; for Alberdi's

These may and do differ in some rather important matters of detail, but they are in agreement in making Alberdi a remarkable man. He is described by García Calderón as a conservative philosopher, an admirer of Guizot, a lover of order, a defender of Protestantism in a Catholic land, a believer in education of a practical and technical kind—a man, in fine, of gravity, common sense, and realism.⁵ Baqué emphasizes the talents, the bent of mind, and defects of Alberdi as a lawyer; García Mérou dwells upon his abilities as an economist.⁶ Matienzo, who said that Alberdi in his last years shared with Sarmiento the national admiration of Argentina, summed up his estimate by saying: "A long time will pass, many generations will pass, before the South Americans are able to speak of railroads, ports, canals, commerce, industry, population, immigration, education and teaching, wealth and national taxation, American politics, and peace and international justice without there coming to their memory a thought of Alberdi." Few questions of interest to American civilization escaped the notice of Alberdi. He was not only a writer on many subjects, but—although there were distinct evidences of the influence of Montesquieu, Locke, Jeremy Bentham, Adam Smith, Lermínier, Jouffroy and Rossi—he was in general an original and independent thinker. As a positive man, with a courage of conviction, he became involved in many controversies, having to answer the replies his articles and books evoked. And, being so often ahead of his generation, he frequently came to moderate the views to which his ardor and originality—or his haste in

influence, see García Mérou (*op. cit.*); Santiago Baqué, *Influencia de Alberdi en la Organización del Estado Argentino*, 1915; José Nicolás Matienzo, *El Gobierno Representativo Federal en la República Argentina*, 1910; Matienzo, Introduction, *El Crimen de la Guerra*; C. Martos, *Judicio sobre las Obras de Alberdi*, 1857; P. Groussac, *El Desarrollo Constitucional y las "Bases" de Alberdi (Anales de la Biblioteca, III.)* 1902; for Alberdi's works see *Obras Completas* (edited by M. Bilbao and A. Reynal O'Connor) 8 vols. 1886-87; *Escritos Póstumos* (edited by Francisco Cruz) 16 vols., 1895-1900.

⁵ F. García-Calderón, *Latin America, its Rise and Progress*, pp. 236, 246-47.

⁶ Baqué, *Influencia de Alberdi*, p. 26, "Alberdi era abogado nato." Cf. P. Groussac, *Juan Bautista Alberdi (La Biblioteca, III. 482)*. García Mérou, *op. cit.*, chap. on the "*Sistema económico y rentístico*." Baqué doubts that Alberdi's reading was very wide, but states that his powers of observation were acute.

forming opinions—had committed him. Baqué and Groussac allude to certain contradictions in Alberdi's works, some of which may be explained, according to García Mérou, by the softening influences of time and reflection upon views previously formed.⁷

He is especially remembered as an advocate of constitutional monarchy of the type as he thought best developed in Great Britain.⁸ This form of government, which to him was far from being incompatible with liberty and democracy, would bring about with the help of Europe order and stability and, together with the changes in public policy which its adoption would imply, would save the South American countries.⁹ In his examination of the forms of government, he sought that which was to him the most capable of giving order, liberty, and progress; and he concluded that monarchy would best serve this purpose. He endeavored with great ingenuity of reasoning to show that monarchy was reconcilable with the revolution; that such a form of government was the real desire of such men as San Martín, Bolívar, Sucre, Alvear, Rivadavia, Belgrano, Posadas, and others. That he was not wedded to the monarchical form of government, however, was demonstrated in his thesis on republics, in which he held that the republican form was the ideal—a form of government which at some future time South America might be ready

⁷ Baqué, pp. 26-27; Groussac, *El desarrollo constitucional y las "Bases" de Alberdi*, op. cit. (cf. the fourth monograph in Groussac's *Estudios de Historia Argentina*); García Mérou says of his style: "... qué tesoro de observación y de doctrina nos deja por legado! Es precisamente en nuestros días cuando puede apreciarse en toda su poderosa frondosidad su obra de patriota y estadista. Con la clarividencia del genio él se ha adelantado á los tiempos, y ha puesto sobre el tapete todas las cuestiones que más tarde han sido afrontadas y resueltas dando la razón al pensador que había previsto de antemano. Jurisconsulto de vistas propias y fundamentales, político penetrante, constitucionalista profundo, escritor refinado y sentencioso, periodista contundente, satírico punzante y mordaz, son innumerables las facetas de su espíritu onduloso. Es al mismo tiempo poeta y sabio, crítico y creador. Posee la ciencia admirable del estilo, y su frase transparente, sin grandes fulguraciones oratorias, causó mayores estragos que el golpe de maza del declamador. Al leerlo, se recorren todas las notas de la expresión y se recuerda instintivamente á Montesquieu y Swift, á Voltaire y Heine.

⁸ Alberdi, *Escritos Póstumos*, (IV. *Del Gobierno en Sud-América*, 1896).

⁹ *Ibid.*, Chaps. VI. and VII.

for, but of the republic as then constituted, he wrote that it "has been and is still the bread of presidents, the trade of soldiers, the industry of lawyers without causes, and journalists without talent; the refuge of the second rate of every species, and the machine for the amalgamation of all the dross of society".¹⁰ Later he remarks:

We do not dissent from the republic in itself, in the abstract and ideal, but from the republic deformed and monstrous, which we see in practice; from the republic with tyranny and misery, with disorders, with revolutions; we dissent in a word from the governments of Bolivia, Peru, Venezuela, New Granada, La Plata, which only by sarcasm can be called republics.¹¹

These republics, he said, were in reality disguised monarchies still suffering from a type of medieval feudalism, without the advantages of order; they were nominal republics without effective guarantees of liberty. Later he modified his ideas of republics—presumably on account of the experience of Mexico under Maximilian.¹² In practice he had supported them loyally, had come to the conclusion that they could not be abolished, and proposed ways by which they might be strengthened by centralization of power as in Chile.¹³ Indeed, he devoted a considerable part of his life to a discussion of the ways and means of organizing, perfecting, and reforming republican institutions. It was about the constitutional organization of Argentina that he wrote in 1852 the work of fundamental importance: *Bases y puntos de partida para la organización política de la República Argentina*. García Mérou, after stating that this book won international recogni-

¹⁰ Quoted García Calderón, *op. cit.*, p. 247.

¹¹ Cuando disintimos de la república, no disintimos de la república en sí, de la república abstracta, del ideal de la república; sino de la república deforme y monstruosa, que vemos en práctica; de la república con tiranía; con miseria, con desórdenes, con atentados; disintimos, en una palabra, del gobierno que vemos en Bolivia, en el Perú, en Venezuela, en Nueva Granada, en el Plata, etc., que solo por sarcasmo puede apellidarse *republicano*. (*Del Gobierno en Sud América*, p. 197.)

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 653.

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 573 *et seq.*

tion, compared it as a work in jurisprudence to that of Blackstone and Kent.¹⁴ As to the exact amount or degree of influence that this book had on the constitutional organization of Argentina is a matter of dispute among historians and politicians, but the excellent work of Dr. Santiago Baqué would lead us to think that it was definitive. In it, Alberdi, under the guidance of Montesquieu offers an exposition of the federal form that was fitted for Argentina, though he admired the unitary type. He is often described as a conservative—and such he was when it came to “law and order”—but in his work he offered also many radically progressive measures as necessary to the progress of the new Argentina. Forms of government, and the political life which he thought incident to them—it must ever be kept in mind—had a very definite relation, as he saw it, to the Monroe Doctrine and American diplomacy.

To him the South American revolution was a complex movement of civilization caused in the main by European inspiration, especially that of France and Great Britain. From Europe came the ideas and revolutionary propaganda, the men trained in liberalism, and, finally, money, munitions, and armed troops. It is well known that Alberdi, in his interpretation of the Hispanic American revolution, thought of the Napoleonic invasion of Spain and the subsequent conduct of the French government respecting Ferdinand VII., together with the legal complications following these actions, as immediate—not as ultimate and fundamental—causes of that revolution. Concerning this set of circumstances, he developed his doctrine of “trivial causes”.¹⁵ This revolution was to him, on the contrary, inevitable because Spain had prevented free intercourse between the colonies and the rest of the world—had blocked there the progress of civilization. The revolution was an expression of the essential unity of the world, as opposed to the thought of the existence of a distinct system in this hemisphere,—as was said in the message of Monroe. To him, further, the European character of the Hispanic Ameri-

¹⁴ García Mérou, *op. cit.*, p. 182. The *Bases* has gone through ten editions, the eleventh being, according to Baqué, in preparation.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 61.

cans in race, culture, and aspiration was a self-evident fact—a fact, and this was equally evident, which made cordial interrelation natural. America was simply “Europe established in America”.¹⁶ To this fact was linked the sentiment of gratitude. European intervention had not only given South America its immediate cause of revolution and had afforded it the substantial means of successfully conducting its wars of independence, but had enabled the United States to win its independence.¹⁷ In the South American revolution the part of the United States, on the contrary, had been negligible, after giving the example of rebellion. Officially the United States had been neutral, and Alberdi made a good deal out of an alleged prohibition, in 1817, of the construction of ships to aid the patriots of South America. The policy of the United States had been that of non-intervention, especially, he said, when this country was fearful of antagonizing Spain during the negotiations for the purchase of Florida. Even when it came to the stirring times of 1820–1823, the policy of the Washington government was hesitant and in the main consistent with non-intervention. Alberdi attributes reluctance to Monroe when the occasion of the threat of certain European powers against Hispanic American independence seemed certain to result in action.¹⁸ The credit for the origination of the Monroe Doctrine goes entirely to Canning and Great Britain, for Alberdi does not attempt to go back of the English proposal to the United States for a joint declaration of policy for any American evolution of the doctrine.¹⁹ “Origen europeo de la doctrina de Monröe” is a phrase or a thought that was constantly with him in his treatment of American diplomacy. There is nothing to show, so far as the writer knows, that Alberdi objected to the Monroe Doctrine in its pristine significance; but, on the contrary, much to indicate that he approved of it tacitly as a matter of course—as being of European origin. He minimizes the effect

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 151; cf. *Del Gobierno en Sud América*, pp. 485–506; cf. *Accion de la Europa en América*.

¹⁷ *Del Gobierno en Sud América*, pp. 48–123; cf. *Acción de Europa en América*.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 601 *et seq.*

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 620, 622, 657.

of Monroe's message, regarding the English attitude and policy, as manifested at the Congresses of Laybach and Verona and in the correspondence with France as carried on between Canning and Prince Polignac, as being after all the decisive factor in preventing action by members of the Holy Alliance.

The influence of the United States, however, was more powerful when it came to the governments formed late in the revolution and immediately afterward in the nationalistic period. This influence was due to the forces of federalism and the Monroe Doctrine. The United States was the great model in government, which was imitated by many states of Hispanic America, but imitated, said Alberdi, in an inverse order.²⁰ The States of South America, as he explained it, had been as colonies unitary, consolidated parts of an empire, with provinces having only an administrative autonomy. In order to be like the United States, these countries, as independent states, had set industriously about making these provinces into sovereign states; and, while the United States soon became in fact, if not in theory of the law, a centralized republic, its South American imitators continued with some exceptions as federations which in some cases leaned toward confederations.²¹ He claimed this sort of imitation to have been, to quote some of his terms, "puerile", "frivolous", "nominal", and "disastrous", by which the nation had been unmade, and by which the national government was reduced to a name—an unhappy fact which made possible the disorders which were the source of weakness of those countries.²² This influence, therefore, contributed to the anarchy of the first half of the century—the implication being that in so far the United States was negatively responsible. Where direct responsibility came in was in connection with the Monroe Doctrine. That doctrine, properly and literally interpreted was, he said, directed to prevent intervention which had objects of oppression or of controlling in some way the destinies of Hispanic American peoples, but intervention

²⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 439-453.

²¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 437-440.

²² *Ibid.*, pp. 442-445.

conducted by some one of the despotic governments of Europe.²³ It did not properly apply to free Europe, at that time to England, or later to France. Subsequently, he held, the Monroe Doctrine came to oppose indiscriminately all political intervention by Europe, although such intervention might not have the motive of colonization nor that of destroying the independence of the Hispanic American countries; but, on the contrary, it might have given them freedom and orderly self-government, and have ended the anarchy to which otherwise those countries were left.²⁴ The Monroe Doctrine has thus been converted into a species of colonial system. In final analysis it becomes intervention against intervention.²⁵ “Despues que los Estados Unidos debieren todo á Europa, quieren aislar la América de Europa, por todo otro punto que no sea los Estados Unidos, convertidos en aduana única de la civilización de origen tras-atlantico,—Monröe queria hacer de su país el *Porto-Bello de la libertad Americana*’.”²⁶ The Monroe Doctrine, he said, is the offspring of egoism. Pursuing in the main itself a policy of non-intervention the United States has through the Monroe Doctrine, deprived South America of a source of legitimate aid by which it could have secured its political regeneration as, for instance, in overthrowing the Rosas rule in Argentina. In his *Acción de la Europa en América*, he defended the Anglo-French intervention in La Plata, and foreign aid was invoked in his *Los Americanos ligados al extranjero*. Alberdi would have opposed as vehemently as any the intervention which had for its purpose the destruction of independence or that of expansion by conquest, but he did not ascribe such purposes to all intervention. An intervention by a free country, even of a military nature, which had for its purpose the establishment of freedom and good government—that is, European civilization—was a thing to be desired. These ideas brought the charge of treason to American freedom and independence, against which he vigorously defended himself.²⁷ He had little fear and no ex-

²³ *Ibid.*, pp. 468-480.

²⁴ *Ibid.*

²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 619.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 123, 619.

²⁷ Particularly from the Rosas party.

pectation of European aggression, for he sharply distinguished free Europe from despotic Europe having fear only of the latter. The idea of European conquest he dismissed with serene confidence as an idle dream. He thus frankly and confidently denied what to many of us requires no stretch of the imagination clearly to recognize: namely, "that without the great principle of isolation, Central and South America would be a field of great colonial rivalry".²⁸ The constructive political intervention, the Monroe Doctrine prevented and thereby converted the South American countries into indirect colonies of the United States.²⁹ "Aislarse de la Europa civilizada es recolonizarse". The prohibition was especially absurd since the United States had been the only country of the western hemisphere which has had a European king for its ally. The doctrine thus prevented them from doing a thing—that is, forming helpful political alliances—which the United States had done and could do again. Not only does the Monroe Doctrine act as a deterrent to reform effected in this way, by excluding liberal European aid, but it is no real guarantee of independence nor preventive of conquest. It leaves the United States and Brazil free to do what Europeans may not do. Mexico was eloquent testimony to Alberdi, as to others, that the United States might enter upon careers of conquest at the expense of Hispanic American countries. He was very positive as to the imperial ambitions of the United States and Brazil, and went so far as to assert that the United States was well content that the South American states should remain weak.³⁰ He was, on the contrary, not afraid of liberal Europe. Had not England really stopped the Holy Alliance? And Eng-

²⁸ Herbert Kraus, What European Countries think of the Monroe Doctrine, 107 (*Annals of the Amer. Academy of Pol. and Soc. Sci.*, LIV, July 1914).

²⁹ *Del Gobierno en Sud América*, p. 141 et seq.

³⁰ Oneto y Viana, *La Diplomacia de la Bresil*: "Alberdi conceived against Brazil one of those imaginary animosities and carried on a campaign to discredit Brazil." This animosity, if such it was, caused Alberdi frankly to state his fears of Brazilian ambitions. In marked contrast to the blunt frankness of Alberdi, one may think of the subtle Rio Branco who announced his fears of Argentine intentions respecting Uruguay and Paraguay. *Del Gobierno en Sud América*, p. 628 et seq.

land, it was intimated, would on occasion do so again. He thought liberal Europe the best guarantee against the United States and Brazil.

Aside from being geographically located in the same hemisphere and being a lover of liberty, he argued further, there was no reason why the United States should have this protectorate over South America. On the other hand, there were very real reasons why liberal Europe should be the active friend and protector. Hispanic American countries were more intimate with Europe than with each other.³¹ Only Europe gives them immigrants with which to recruit their populations, capital and machinery for the development of their resources, manufactured commodities for their consumption, railroads for their transportation, boats for their commerce. In turn Europe opens for them a ready market for their raw materials and foodstuffs, there thus being a natural exchange. The importance of these considerations in his system will be made clear, perhaps, by brief reference to his theories respecting domestic policy. Alberdi had a materialistic conception of civilization, in that, to him, industrial progress, the accumulation of wealth by legitimate production, the development of commerce and a mercantile marine service, the building of railroads—in fine, the introduction of industrial revolution—were essentials. In securing the sort of civilization he desired, great emphasis was placed on immigration. Depopulation, on the one hand, and backwardness, poverty, and misery, on the other, were placed in his thought virtually as cause and effect. He thought that foreigners, especially those from England, would bring in not only new and improved industries and capital, but “habits of order and customs of education”. His ideas may be summed up in his famous maxim: “En América, gobernar es poblar”.³² Each of the countries needs the industrial and commercial advantages mentioned above; and no one country of this hemisphere is able to give them to the rest. And

³¹ *Del Gobierno de la Sud América*, p. 587. He comments on the fact that in his time South American newspapers were devoted so largely to European affairs, those of local countries being secondary.

³² García Mérou, *op. cit.*, p. 222 *et seq.*

the United States, a receiver of European immigrants, an exporter of raw materials and foodstuffs, without an adequate merchant marine service for its own use—is in no position to give them. Thus economic ties make South America the natural ally of Europe. Racial kinship, cultural affinity and community, and economic consolidation and exchange form the grounds for Alberdi's interpretation of the proper basis of international relations of South America.

To obtain what he thought desirable ends, he proposed as early as 1844 the formation of a Hispanic American league to insure continental equilibrium. This league was to be supported by an agreement with certain European powers—without which Alberdi thought it would be sterile—involving no sacrifice of independence, but a guarantee of it. He proposed for his league a congress which should arrange for the joint control or jurisdiction over boundary line disputes and international rivers. Its other projected duties and powers related to: arbitration of disputes; codification of international law; control of river commerce; construction of international telegraph lines, railroads, and highways; establishment of uniform postal, customs, and extradition laws, uniform monetary, weights and measures standards; the limitation of armaments; etc. In this fashion he anticipated the subject matter of later Pan American conferences, though, so far as the writer knows, his name was not even mentioned at the Washington Congress. He looked in no vague way toward a league of nations (*Estados Unidos del Mundo*) to an international government, for the guarantee of political independence, territorial integrity, and good government.

Alberdi regarded as frivolous the proposition of including the United States in such Hispanic American league—saying on the occasion of being made a doctor by the University of Chile, that the United States had “on more than one occasion laughed at their simple kinsmen of the South; certainly they have not refused us toasts and compliments, but I do not remember that they have ever fired a shot in our defense”. He further remarked that “Tomar á los Estados Unidos, en lugar de la Europa, como fuente de civilización, es recibir la civilización europea de segunda

mano. Es el Monopolio norte-americano sustituido al español". He was notwithstanding this attitude no enemy of the United States. He even proposed some twelve ways in which the Hispanic Americans could profitably imitate the United States. He said that "The type of hero in the future is not Napoleon, but Washington". The United States, to him, simply did not fulfill the necessary conditions in cultural attainments, international understanding and sympathy, nor finally in the gratification of South America's economic and sociological requirements. It is to be inferred, however, that before he would be ready to give the United States the position he so readily gave to liberal Europe in his scheme, it would have to meet the following conditions:

It would have to make positive guarantees that it would attempt no further expansion by conquest at the expense of an Hispanic American country.

It would have to establish a commerce, by supplying them with capital, industries, machinery, merchant marine, and opening a market for South American products.

It must develop an appreciative reciprocity in culture.

WILLIAM WHATLEY PIERSON, JR.